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Matteo Castiglioni
Matteo Castiglioni
Ph.D. Student, Politecnico di Milano
Geverifieerd e-mailadres voor polimi.it - Homepage
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Online bayesian persuasion
M Castiglioni, A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33, 16188-16198, 2020
222020
Election control in social networks via edge addition or removal
M Castiglioni, D Ferraioli, N Gatti
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1878-1885, 2020
182020
Persuading voters: it's easy to whisper, it's hard to speak loud
M Castiglioni, A Celli, N Gatti
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1870-1877, 2020
182020
Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti, S Coniglio
Artificial Intelligence 277, 103177, 2019
142019
Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders.
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti
IJCAI, 123-129, 2019
132019
Signaling in bayesian network congestion games: the subtle power of symmetry
M Castiglioni, A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35 (6), 5252-5259, 2021
122021
Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions.
A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti
IJCAI, 485-491, 2019
122019
Multi-receiver online bayesian persuasion
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, A Celli, N Gatti
International Conference on Machine Learning, 1314-1323, 2021
82021
Persuading Voters in District-based Elections
M Castiglioni, N Gatti
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35 (6), 5244--5251, 2021
72021
Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti
Artificial Intelligence 300, 103549, 2021
52021
Public bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive
M Castiglioni, A Celli, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.05156, 2020
52020
Election manipulation on social networks with messages on multiple candidates
M Castiglioni, D Ferraioli, G Landriani, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.03779, 2019
42019
Bayesian agency: Linear versus tractable contracts
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti
Artificial Intelligence 307, 103684, 2022
32022
Safe online bid optimization with return-on-investment and budget constraints subject to uncertainty
M Castiglioni, A Nuara, G Romano, G Spadaro, F Trov˛, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.07139, 2022
32022
Signaling in Posted Price Auctions
M Castiglioni, G Romano, A Marchesi, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.12183, 2022
22022
Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions
F Bacchiocchi, M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, G Romano, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.09728, 2022
22022
Election manipulation on social networks: Seeding, edge removal, edge addition
M Castiglioni, D Ferraioli, N Gatti, G Landriani
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 71, 1049-1090, 2021
22021
Leadership in congestion games: multiple user classes and non-singleton actions (extended version)
A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13108, 2019
22019
Be a leader or become a follower: the strategy to commit to with multiple leaders (extended version)
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13106, 2019
22019
Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting
M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti
arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.00605, 2022
12022
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Artikelen 1–20