| ProVerif 2.02 pl1: Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Verifier, User Manual and Tutorial B Blanchet, B Smyth, V Cheval, M Sylvestre | 352* | 2020 |
| Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols S Kremer, M Ryan, B Smyth 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'10), 389-404, 2010 | 212 | 2010 |
| Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy V Cortier, B Smyth Journal of Computer Security 21 (1), 89-148, 2013 | 180 | 2013 |
| Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy V Cortier, B Smyth 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 297-311, 2011 | 180 | 2011 |
| Adapting Helios for provable ballot privacy D Bernhard, V Cortier, O Pereira, B Smyth, B Warinschi 16th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'11), 335-354, 2011 | 92 | 2011 |
| Automatic verification of privacy properties in the applied pi calculus S Delaune, M Ryan, B Smyth 2nd Joint iTrust and PST Conferences on Privacy, Trust Management and …, 2008 | 89 | 2008 |
| Applied pi calculus MD Ryan, B Smyth Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols, Chapter 6, 2011 | 87 | 2011 |
| Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA): Ensuring privacy with corrupt administrators B Smyth, M Ryan, L Chen 4th European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad hoc and Sensor Networks …, 2007 | 81 | 2007 |
| Towards automatic analysis of election verifiability properties B Smyth, M Ryan, S Kremer, M Kourjieh Joint Workshop on Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and …, 2010 | 57 | 2010 |
| A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast D Khader, B Smyth, PYA Ryan, F Hao 5th International Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE'12), 285-299, 2012 | 52 | 2012 |
| Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers B Blanchet, B Smyth Journal of Computer Security 26 (3), 367-422, 2018 | 41 | 2018 |
| Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers B Blanchet, B Smyth 2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 310-324, 2016 | 41 | 2016 |
| Truncating TLS Connections to Violate Beliefs in Web Applications B Smyth, A Pironti WOOT'13: 7th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies.(First appeared at …, 2013 | 41* | 2013 |
| Formal verification of cryptographic protocols with automated reasoning B Smyth PhD thesis, School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, 2011 | 41 | 2011 |
| Election Verifiability: Cryptographic Definitions and an Analysis of Helios, Helios-C, and JCJ B Smyth, S Frink, MR Clarkson | 37* | 2017 |
| Ballot secrecy and ballot independence coincide B Smyth, D Bernhard European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 463-480, 2013 | 35* | 2013 |
| Secure authenticated key exchange with revocation for smart grid F Zhao, Y Hanatani, Y Komano, B Smyth, S Ito, T Kambayashi 2012 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 1-8, 2012 | 35 | 2012 |
| Ballot secrecy: Security definition, sufficient conditions, and analysis of Helios B Smyth Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/942, 2018 | 19* | 2018 |
| Modelling and analysis of a hierarchy of distance bounding attacks T Chothia, J De Ruiter, B Smyth 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), 1563-1580, 2018 | 17 | 2018 |
| Ballot secrecy with malicious bulletin boards B Smyth, D Bernhard Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/822, 2014 | 17* | 2014 |
Mark D. RyanProfessor of Computer Security, University of BirminghamAdresse e-mail validée de cs.bham.ac.uk
