| Political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias D Bernhardt, S Krasa, M Polborn Journal of Public Economics 92 (5-6), 1092-1104, 2008 | 459 | 2008 |
| Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable S Krasa, AP Villamil Econometrica 68 (1), 119-134, 2000 | 282 | 2000 |
| Monitoring the monitor: an incentive structure for a financial intermediary S Krasa, AP Villamil Journal of Economic Theory 57 (1), 197-221, 1992 | 266 | 1992 |
| Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting? S Krasa, MK Polborn Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291, 2009 | 157 | 2009 |
| Entrepreneurs, risk aversion, and dynamic firms N Herranz, S Krasa, AP Villamil Journal of Political Economy 123 (5), 1133-1176, 2015 | 109 | 2015 |
| The value allocation of an economy with differential information S Krasa, NC Yannelis Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 881-900, 1994 | 97 | 1994 |
| A theory of optimal bank size S Kras, AP Villamil Oxford Economic Papers 44 (4), 725-749, 1992 | 96 | 1992 |
| Competition between specialized candidates S Krasa, M Polborn American Political Science Review 104 (4), 745-765, 2010 | 94 | 2010 |
| Political competition between differentiated candidates S Krasa, MK Polborn Games and Economic Behavior 76 (1), 249-271, 2012 | 93 | 2012 |
| Social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework S Krasa, M Polborn American Economic Review 104 (1), 308-322, 2014 | 91 | 2014 |
| The binary policy model S Krasa, M Polborn Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2), 661-688, 2010 | 63 | 2010 |
| Political competition in legislative elections S Krasa, MK Polborn American Political Science Review 112 (4), 809-825, 2018 | 55 | 2018 |
| Optimal multilateral contracts S Krasa, AP Villamil Economic Theory 4, 167-187, 1994 | 55 | 1994 |
| Bankruptcy and firm finance S Krasa, T Sharma, AP Villamil Economic Theory 36, 239-266, 2008 | 54 | 2008 |
| Money and storage in a differential information economy M Huggett, S Krasa Economic Theory 8, 191-210, 1996 | 51 | 1996 |
| Policy divergence and voter polarization in a structural model of elections S Krasa, M Polborn The Journal of Law and Economics 57 (1), 31-76, 2014 | 44 | 2014 |
| An elementary proof of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz-Shapley theorem S Krasa, NC Yannelis Economic Theory 4, 467-471, 1994 | 32 | 1994 |
| Small firms in the SSBF N Herranz, S Krasa, AP Villamil Annals of Finance 5, 341-359, 2009 | 30 | 2009 |
| Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics N Herranz, S Krasa, AP Villamil Economic Theory 63, 263-285, 2017 | 28 | 2017 |
| Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information S Krasa Journal of Economic Theory 87 (1), 144-168, 1999 | 25 | 1999 |
Charles W. CalomirisProfessor of Finance and Economics, Columbia UniversityVerified email at columbia.edu
