| Pessimistic leader-follower equilibria with multiple followers S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi | 26 | 2017 |
| Bilevel programming approaches to the computation of optimistic and pessimistic single-leader-multi-follower equilibria N Basilico, S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi SEA 75, 1-14, 2017 | 21 | 2017 |
| Leadership in singleton congestion games A Marchesi, S Coniglio, N Gatti International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence 2018, 447-453, 2018 | 17 | 2018 |
| Computing the strategy to commit to in polymatrix games G De Nittis, A Marchesi, N Gatti Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 32 (1), 2018 | 16 | 2018 |
| Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment G Farina, A Marchesi, C Kroer, N Gatti, T Sandholm IJCAI, 2018 | 15 | 2018 |
| Learning to correlate in multi-player general-sum sequential games A Celli, A Marchesi, T Bianchi, N Gatti Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 13076-13086, 2019 | 13 | 2019 |
| Computing a pessimistic stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: The mixed-pure case S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi Algorithmica 82 (5), 1189-1238, 2020 | 12* | 2020 |
| Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders. M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti IJCAI, 123-129, 2019 | 10 | 2019 |
| Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games N Basilico, S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi EURO Journal on Computational Optimization 8 (1), 3-31, 2020 | 9 | 2020 |
| Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti, S Coniglio Artificial Intelligence 277, 103177, 2019 | 9 | 2019 |
| Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions. A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti IJCAI, 485-491, 2019 | 7 | 2019 |
| Quasi-perfect stackelberg equilibrium A Marchesi, G Farina, C Kroer, N Gatti, T Sandholm Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33, 2117-2124, 2019 | 7 | 2019 |
| No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium A Celli, A Marchesi, G Farina, N Gatti Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33, 2020 | 5* | 2020 |
| Learning probably approximately correct maximin strategies in simulation-based games with infinite strategy spaces A Marchesi, F Trovò, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.07755, 2019 | 4 | 2019 |
| On the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium Reoptimization. A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti UAI, 1-10, 2017 | 4 | 2017 |
| Leadership in congestion games: Multiple user classes and non-singleton actions (extended version) A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13108, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| Be a leader or become a follower: The strategy to commit to with multiple leaders (extended version) M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13106, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games (Extended Version) G De Nittis, A Marchesi, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.11914, 2018 | 2 | 2018 |
| A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria N Gatti, M Gilli, A Marchesi Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
| Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry M Castiglioni, A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.05190, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
Nicola GattiPolitecnico di MilanoGeverifieerd e-mailadres voor elet.polimi.it
