| Pessimistic leader-follower equilibria with multiple followers S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi | 22 | 2017 |
| Bilevel programming approaches to the computation of optimistic and pessimistic single-leader-multi-follower equilibria N Basilico, S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi SEA 75, 1-14, 2017 | 15 | 2017 |
| Computing the strategy to commit to in polymatrix games G De Nittis, A Marchesi, N Gatti Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018 | 14 | 2018 |
| Leadership in singleton congestion games A Marchesi, S Coniglio, N Gatti International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence 2018, 447-453, 2018 | 13 | 2018 |
| Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment G Farina, A Marchesi, C Kroer, N Gatti, T Sandholm IJCAI, 2018 | 12 | 2018 |
| Computing a pessimistic leader-follower equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.01438, 2018 | 6 | 2018 |
| Leadership in congestion games: Multiple user classes and non-singleton actions A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on …, 2019 | 4 | 2019 |
| Quasi-perfect stackelberg equilibrium A Marchesi, G Farina, C Kroer, N Gatti, T Sandholm Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33, 2117-2124, 2019 | 4 | 2019 |
| Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games N Basilico, S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi EURO Journal on Computational Optimization, 1-29, 2019 | 4 | 2019 |
| Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti, S Coniglio Artificial Intelligence 277, 103177, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| Be a leader or become a follower: The strategy to commit to with multiple leaders M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on …, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| On the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium Reoptimization. A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti UAI, 1-10, 2017 | 2 | 2017 |
| Leadership in congestion games: Multiple user classes and non-singleton actions (extended version) A Marchesi, M Castiglioni, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13108, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
| Be a leader or become a follower: The strategy to commit to with multiple leaders (extended version) M Castiglioni, A Marchesi, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13106, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
| Learning to Correlate in Multi-Player General-Sum Sequential Games A Celli, A Marchesi, T Bianchi, N Gatti Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 13055-13065, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
| Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games (Extended Version) G De Nittis, A Marchesi, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.11914, 2018 | 1 | 2018 |
| Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry M Castiglioni, A Celli, A Marchesi, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.05190, 2020 | | 2020 |
| Learning Probably Approximately Correct Maximin Strategies in Simulation-Based Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces A Marchesi, F Trovò, N Gatti arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.07755, 2019 | | 2019 |
| Computing a Pessimistic Stackelberg Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: The Mixed-Pure Case S Coniglio, N Gatti, A Marchesi Algorithmica, 1-50, 2019 | | 2019 |
| On the characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria N Gatti, M Gilli, A Marchesi University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and …, 2018 | | 2018 |
Nicola GattiPolitecnico di MilanoGeverifieerd e-mailadres voor elet.polimi.it
